

**DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY**  
**School of Philosophy, Theology & Religion**  
**UNIVERSITY OF BIRMINGHAM**

**Issues in Contemporary Metaphysics**  
**Banner code: PHIL 08 20454**

20 Credits

**MODULE GUIDE**  
**2010/2011**

This module outline **must** be read in conjunction with the relevant sections of *The Philosopher's Stone* and the *Philosophy Study Guide*, available from the Philosophy Office (room 107).

MOMD and Erasmus students should pick up a student pack (including the *Stone* and the *Philosophy Study Guide*) from the Philosophy Office. Erasmus students, please note that your attendance and assessment requirements are exactly the same as for all other students on this module. Please see the *Philosopher's Stone* for more information.

**1. GENERAL INFORMATION**

**Module convenor:** Nikk Effingham  
**Office number:** 114  
**Email:** N.Effingham@bham.ac.uk  
**Office hours:** Wednesday 2-3, Friday 1-2..

**Semester:** One  
**Credit rating:** 20  
**Level:** H

**2. ABOUT THE MODULE**

**MODULE SUMMARY**

This module looks at *ontology* – the question of what things exist (and what they are like if they do). The module begins with an introduction to ontology, before examining metaphysical questions concerning various categories: universals/properties; numbers; possible worlds; space; mereology and composition; persistence; the existence of lesser kinds (groups, holes, works of music etc.).

### 3. MODULE ORGANISATION

**Classes:** Lectures will be held in Watson Building R15 Lecture Theatre C – G24 Ground Floor, Wednesday 11am-1pm. There will be a reading week in Week 6. There will be no classes during Reading Week.

Classes will normally consist of a lecture around an hour to an hour and a half, followed by using the remainder of the period to discuss the topics as much as student cohort desires. In addition there will be bi-weekly seminars held in my office. **You must prepare thoroughly to attend the seminars. Students who do not prepare thoroughly will be asked to leave.**

#### Work and attendance

The work and attendance requirements for this course are that you:

- **Attend all seminars.** If you are absent from a seminar through illness or for any other reason, you should inform the module convenor as soon as possible – if possible, *before* the class.
- **Prepare adequately for seminars** as directed by the module convenor. Students who do not prepare adequately will be asked to leave and marked as absent. This *includes* bringing all required reading to the seminar. Short of having an eidetic memory, it's pointless to read the material on the computer and then think this alone will help when we start referring to specific portions of the reading, or rereading specific paragraphs etc. **Bring it to the seminar.**
- **Complete written work on time:** Failure to complete assessed work by the due date constitutes a violation of the work and attendance requirements.

Persistent violations of work and attendance requirements will be reported to the Senior Tutor. If you have difficulties (e.g. personal, financial or family problems) that result in persistent failure to meet the work and attendance requirements, you should talk to your academic tutor or the Welfare Tutor.

**Students are required by University regulations to display 'due diligence'. Failure to do so may result in your being barred from assessment, which can lead ultimately to exclusion from your degree programme.**

#### Study budget

The University's Code of Practice specifies that a 20-credit module is expected to require about 200 hours work by students.

For this module, you are recommended to break this down roughly as follows:

Lectures	20 hours
Seminars	5 hours
Writing up lecture/seminar notes	15 hours
Preparation for seminars	5 x 14 hours = 70 hours
Essay preparation	2 x 45 = 90
<b>TOTAL:</b>	<b>200 hours</b>

Pay special attention to the essay preparation time – over a week of solid work. Keep this in mind when it comes to writing your essay that the marking of it will bear this level of commitment in mind.

## Prompt arrival at classes

Students should note that all classes in the University start **on the hour** and should end at 50 minutes past the hour. Late arrival at seminars may result in your being marked absent; if you arrive late it is your responsibility to ensure that your presence has been noted.

## 4. ASSESSMENT

### The assessment for this module is as follows:

Two **1500 word** essays (50% each). The maximum is 2000 words – the 1500 word limit is more the size I would expect. I would strongly advise *not* using the extra 500 words unless you have a solid idea of how they're being used as essay marks are partly decided on clarity and succinctness so using more words when less would do can easily drive your mark down. Anything that is even a word over 2000, including footnotes, will receive penalty marks.

Please note that not every module in philosophy has the same limit or proviso (some are 1500 and not a word more, some are expected to be 2000) so do check for each individual module what the requirement is.

### ASSESSMENT CRITERIA

For the Philosophy Department's assessment criteria and guidance on how to meet them, see the *Philosophy Study Guide*.

### Presentation

Essays must be typed in at least 12 point in a readable font, with wide margins and page numbers, and should **not** be single spaced. They should include proper bibliography and references; **poor referencing can result in a lower mark**. See the *Study Guide* for guidelines and the *Philosopher's Stone* for information about penalties.

**Failure to provide adequate referencing can amount to plagiarism. Plagiarism is a form of cheating and can lead to exclusion from your degree programme.** Please see the *Study Guide* for guidance on avoiding plagiarism and the *Philosopher's Stone* for information about how cases of plagiarism are dealt with.

### Word limit

Your essay **MUST NOT** exceed 2000 words *including* bibliography and footnotes. **You must state the exact number of words used (excluding bibliography) at the end of the main text of your essay, and again on the essay submission form.** If you fail to do this, your essay may be returned to you so that you can add this information, and this may significantly delay the marking process.

See the *Philosopher's Stone* for more information about the word limits and penalties for exceeding them.

## **Deadlines**

The first essay must be handed in by **12.30pm Tuesday 23<sup>rd</sup> November, 2010**. Please note that you ***must*** submit to TurnItIn as well.

The second essay must be handed in by **12.30pm Tuesday 25<sup>th</sup> January, 2011**. Please note that you ***must*** submit to TurnItIn as well.

See the *Philosopher's Stone* for information about the granting of extensions and penalties for unexcused late submission. Late submissions for which no extension has been granted will be penalised at a rate of 5 marks per day.

## **Handing in your essay**

You must hand **two copies** of your essay by 12.30pm on the due date, to the Philosophy Office. An essay submission form must be included with your essay; you can fill this in when you submit your essay. See the *Philosopher's Stone* for more information about essay hand-ins.

## **Uploading your essay to turnitinUK**

You must upload your essay to turnitinUK prior to handing in the hard copies. You will be asked to tick a box confirming this on the essay submission form, and your essay will not be accepted unless you have ticked the box (or attach the form excusing you from this, signed by the Department's plagiarism officer). The essay you submit in hard copy **MUST** be exactly the same as the one you upload to turnitinUK. However if discrepancies do occur, it will be the hard copy that is assessed. See the *Philosopher's Stone* for more information.

## **Return of assessed essays**

A report on your first assessed essay should be available by January 11<sup>th</sup> 2011, provided the essay is submitted on time. A report on your second assessed essay should be available by 22<sup>nd</sup> February 2011 provided the essay is submitted on time. You will receive an email (to your bham.ac.uk account) as soon as your essay is available to pick up from the Philosophy Office; please **do not try to pick up your essay before you have received the email**.

Please note that all essay marks are provisional until confirmed by the Board of Examiners in June. Note also that you are **NOT** entitled to question the academic judgement of the person marking your essay. If you are unhappy with your mark, you should make an appointment with the member of staff who marked the essay to discuss your performance. If you are still not satisfied, you can raise the issue with the Head of Department, who may then arrange for a second member of staff to look at the essay. The HoD will not do this unless you have already discussed your essay with the person who marked it.

Students are welcome to discuss their essay with the module convenor or their academic tutor during office hours.

## ESSAY TITLES

### First Essay

- (1) Are there numbers? If so, are they *sui generis* entities?
- (2) What is the formalist's position on what mathematical statements are about? How realistic is that position?
- (3) Is Logicism about numbers correct?
- (4) Are numbers sets?
- (5) Does our apparent quantification over properties commit us to their existence?
- (6) Evaluate the issues raised concerning where properties are located in spacetime.
- (7) Is there a plausible version of nominalism about properties?
- (8) Is there a problem of universals? If so, what is its solution?
- (9) Does truthmaking theory relieve us of a commitment to properties?
- (10) Are objects bundles of properties? If not, what are they?
- (11) Evaluate modalism.
- (12) Evaluate one criticism of genuine modal realism.
- (13) Compare and contrast two theories of possible worlds.
- (14) Should we believe possible worlds are *ersatz*?
- (15) Is there a successful anti-realist strategy concerning possible worlds?
- (16) Are we ontologically committed to possible worlds and possibilia?
- (17) What does a Carnapian say about ontological questions? Are they correct?
- (18) Is Meinong correct that it is true of some things such that they don't exist?
- (19) Evaluate NeoFregeanism about numbers.

### Second Essay

- (1) Does space exist?
- (2) What is Mach's position on Newton's bucket experiment? Is it plausible?
- (3) What does Poincaré say about the geometry of space? Is he correct?
- (4) How does the theory of relativity bear upon the ontology of space?
- (5) Do incongruent counterparts give us any reason to believe substantivalism?
- (6) Evaluate supersubstantivalism.
- (7) Is the world fundamentally tensed?
- (8) Does Ghenghis Khan exist
- (9) Are there any ontological ramifications of time travel on ontology?
- (10) Evaluate the Growing Block Theory of time.
- (11) Does presentism have a truthmaking problem?
- (12) What is a singular proposition? How does it bear on debates in the philosophy of time?

- (13) What is the best answer to the Special Composition Question?
- (14) Are the facts about composition brute?
- (15) Is the world gunky?
- (16) Evaluate Sider's vagueness argument for mereological universalism.
- (17) Are there any informative necessary and sufficient conditions for something to be a mereological simple?
- (18) Is everything a mereological simple?
- (19) Is composition identity?
- (20) Evaluate one solution to the problem of the statue and the clay.
- (21) Is identity relative?
- (22) Is perdurantism true?
- (23) Do objects endure through time?
- (24) Evaluate Sider's vagueness argument for perdurantism.
- (25) What is the problem of temporary intrinsics? Can perdurantism offer an appropriate answer to that problem?
- (26) Is there a problem of change?
- (27) Do holes exist?
- (28) What should we identify the song *Wannabe* by the Spice Girls with?
- (29) Should we include Microsoft in our ontology? If so, is it *sui generis*?
- (30) Do musical works endure?
- (31) Critically evaluate the reasons for thinking that sounds exist.
- (32) Are our ontological commitments trivial?
- (33) Propose and defend a theory of ontological commitment.
- (34) Is there a distinction between some thing existing and some thing really existing?

For both essays, if you have a question in mind that somehow does not appear on the above list, just come and see me and we should be able to arrange it so you can do your own question.

## 5. OUTLINE OF THE MODULE

### Semester 1

#### **Week 1 (beginning 4<sup>th</sup> October): Ontology and ontological commitment**

##### *Required Reading:*

Swyer, C. (2008). Abstract Entities, from Sider, Hawthorne and Zimmerman (eds.) *Contemporary Debates in Metaphysics* Oxford: Blackwell, p. 11-31. [in coursepack]

Quine, W. (1948). On What There Is, *Review of Metaphysics* 2, reprinted in Loux (ed.) *Metaphysics: Contemporary Readings* London: Routledge, p. 42-56 [in coursepack]

**Week 2 (beginning 11<sup>th</sup> October): Universals and Properties**

*Required Reading:*

Armstrong, D. (1989). *Universals: An Opinionated Introduction* Boulder: Westview Press, Chapter 5 [in coursepack]

Jackson, F. (1977). Statements about universals, *Mind* 86: 427-9. [*not* in coursepack]

**Week 3 (beginning 18<sup>th</sup> October) Numbers**

*Required Reading:* None, as there's no associated seminar. I recommend the Putnam and Benacerraf pieces from the reading list below if you want a good starting point.

*Week 3 Seminar Topic:* Ontology and Properties

**Week 4 (beginning 25<sup>th</sup> October): Possible Worlds**

*Required Reading:*

Lewis, D. (1973). *Counterfactuals*, Oxford: Blackwell, p. 84-91 [in coursepack]

Stalnaker, R. (1983). *Inquiry* chapter 3, reprinted in Laurance and MacDonald (eds.) *Contemporary Readings in the Foundations of Metaphysics* Oxford: Blackwell, p. 103-116. [in coursepack]

**Week 5 (beginning 1<sup>st</sup> November): Possible worlds**

*Required Reading:*

Rosen, G. (1990). Modal Fictionalism, *Mind* 99: 327-54. [*not* in coursepack]

*Week 5 Seminar Topic:* Possible Worlds

**Week 6 (beginning 8<sup>th</sup> November): Reading Week (no lecture)**

**Week 7 (beginning 15<sup>th</sup> November): Space**

*Required Reading:*

Sklar, L. 1992. *Philosophy of Physics* p. 40-69. [in coursepack]

Huggett, N. 1999. *Space from Zeno to Einstein*, chapter 12. [in coursepack]

*Week 7 Seminar Topic:* Space

**Week 8 (beginning 22<sup>nd</sup> November): Mereology**

*Required Reading:*

Markosian, N. (2008). Restricted Composition, from Sider, Hawthorne and Zimmerman (eds.) *Contemporary Debates in Metaphysics* Oxford: Blackwell, p. 341-63. [*not* in coursepack: available from Ned Markosian's website at <http://myweb.facstaff.wvu.edu/nmarkos/Papers/RC.pdf>]

Sider, T. (2001). *Four-Dimensionalism* Oxford: OUP, p. 120-32 [in coursepack, indeed I've included it all the way up to page 139]

Sider, T. (1993). Van Inwagen and the Possibility of Gunk, *Analysis* 53: 285-89 [*not* in coursepack]

**Week 9 (beginning 29<sup>th</sup> November): Endurantism**

*Required Reading:*

Olson, E. (1996). Composition and Coincidence, *Pacific Philosophical Quarterly* 77: 374-403. [in coursepack]

*Week 9 Seminar Topic:* Mereology

**Week 10 (beginning 6<sup>th</sup> December): Perdurantism**

*Required Reading:*

Wasserman, R. (2002). The Standard Objection to the Standard Account, *Philosophical Studies* 111: 197-216. [*not* in coursepack]

## Week 11 (beginning 13<sup>th</sup> December):

## Lesser Kinds

*Recommended Reading:* No seminar so none required. See suggested reading if you're interested in reading around the topic.

*Week 11 Seminar Topic:* Persistence

### 6. READING LIST

**Compulsory purchase:** The only compulsory purchase is the coursepack (*both* parts), although you have to make sure that you get hold of readings not in the coursepack. An eminently sensible idea is to print them all off *now* and then you'll have them when you need them. **You are expected to bring the readings to the seminar.** Unless you are Mr. Marvel and have an eidetic memory, reading them on the computer won't prove helpful when you want to refer to them in the seminar.

**Course pack:** A course pack is available for this module, at the cost of £1 per part (it comes in two parts). This includes **some** of the readings for the seminars/lectures. If you have not yet bought a course pack, please buy one from the Philosophy Office.

**Unavailable Readings:** Some readings are not stocked by our library. In my office I have a folder containing those readings for you to photocopy. Following debacles in previous years, of students stealing the material when it was made freely available, I am unwilling to place these readings in a public area. If you want access to them, come to my office with a crisp £20 note as a deposit and I will let you take them to photocopy (returning your money when you bring the folder back). The folder will be available from week 2. The papers that are in this file are noted below by the phrase 'Copy in File'.

**Recommended purchases:** As the cost of obligatory readings are so low, I **strongly** advise purchasing a further text or two. If you organise yourselves into small groups ('book clubs') of three or four, this is a lot easier as each of you can buy one text thus you'll jointly have access to 3/4 books. Given that there is no compulsory purchase, I don't think it unreasonable for you to purchase one or two of the following. Using the 'book club' idea will make this even easier.

Particularly useful general introductions are:

Loux, M. (1998). *Metaphysics: A Contemporary Introduction*, London: Routledge. (numerous later editions are also available, and will do just as well).

Lowe, E. (2002). *A Survey of Metaphysics*, Oxford: OUP.

I *particularly* recommend the Lowe. In addition, for every section of the course there's a book that will prove invaluable. For universals and properties I'd get strongly recommend:

Armstrong, D. (1989). *Universals: An Opinionated Introduction* Boulder: Westview Press.

Oliver, A. (1996). The Metaphysics of Properties, *Mind* 105: 1-80. [Okay, not a book or a purchase, but still very good]

For numbers I recommend:

Bostock, D. (2009) *Philosophy of Mathematics: An Introduction* Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell.

Shapiro, S. (2000). *Thinking About Mathematics: The Philosophy of Mathematics*, Oxford: OUP.

For possible worlds and modality I'd recommend:

Lewis, D. (1986) *On The Plurality of Worlds* Oxford: Blackwell.

For mereology I would recommend:

Van Inwagen, P. (1990). *Material Beings* Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

For persistence I recommend:

Sider, T. (2001). *Four-Dimensionalism: An Ontology of Persistence and Time* Oxford: Clarendon.

There is no recommended *purchase* for the Lesser Kinds topic or the space topic.

## General Reading List

Generally useful introductions to metaphysics include:

Aune, B. (1985). *Metaphysics: The Elements*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Jubien, M. (1997). *Contemporary Metaphysics: An Introduction* Oxford: Blackwell.

Loux, M. (1998). *Metaphysics: A Contemporary Introduction*, London: Routledge. (numerous later editions are also available, and will do just as well).

Lowe, E. (2002). *A Survey of Metaphysics*, Oxford: OUP.

MacDonald, C. (2005). *Varieties of Things: Foundations of Contemporary Metaphysics*, Oxford: Blackwell. [on order]

Taylor, R. (1992) *Metaphysics* Englewood: Prentice Hall.

van Inwagen, P. (2002). *Metaphysics*, Cambridge MA: Westview.

The following anthologies may also be useful:

Crane, T. and Farkas, K. (2004). *Metaphysics: A Guide and Anthology* Oxford: OUP.

Kim, J. and Sosa, E. (eds.) (1999). *Metaphysics: An Anthology* Oxford: Blackwell.

Laurence, S. and MacDonald, C. (eds.) (1998). *Contemporary Readings in the Foundations of Metaphysics*, Oxford: Blackwell.

Loux, M. (ed.) (2001). *Metaphysics: Contemporary Readings*, London: Routledge.

van Inwagen, P. and Zimmerman, D. (eds.) (1998). *Metaphysics: The Big Questions*, Oxford: Blackwell.

The following reference books are very useful:

Kim, J. and Sosa, E. (eds.) (1995). *A Companion to Metaphysics* Oxford: Blackwell.

Le Poidevin, R. *et al* (eds.) (2009) *The Routledge Companion to Metaphysics* London: Routledge.

Loux, M. and Zimmerman, D. (eds.) (2003). *The Oxford Handbook of Metaphysics*, Oxford: OUP.

Sider, T. *et al* (eds.) (2007) *Contemporary Debates in Metaphysics* Malden: Blackwell.

## Selected Readings: Brief Comments

Below are some readings for the specific topics. This list is *not* comprehensive. Only the foolish would think so. Don't feel limited to it, and under *no* circumstances think you should read all of these things before doing your essay! Remember, it's down to you and your research skills to successfully navigate the material out there to produce the best essay – randomly picking texts won't achieve this, nor will wading through as much as possible.

Texts marked with an (\*) are particularly useful introductions. Texts marked with a (†) are particularly interesting (from my point of view, at any rate), either because of an intrinsically interesting argument or because they're widely known and widely read.

I've also left off a lot of internet sources, such as the *Stanford Encyclopedia*, and you'll find useful article in *Philosophy Compass*. Feel free to check for relevant articles there as well.

## Selected Readings: Ontological Commitment

Ontological commitment, and the other broad topics discussed in the introductory lecture, is an exceedingly hard topic. As made clear in the lectures, I don't particularly intend for you to look into this. But, if you're interested, here are some readings for you to start.

- Aune, B. (1985). *Metaphysics: The Elements*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Chapters 1 and 2. (\*)
- Brock, S. and Mares, E. (2007). *Realism and Anti-Realism*, Stocksfield: Acumen. Chapter 2
- Cameron, R. Forthcoming. How to have a radically minimal ontology, *Philosophical Studies*. (†)
- Hofweber, T. (2005). A Puzzle About Ontology, *Nous* 39: 256-83. (†)
- Jenkins, C. (2010). What is Ontological Realism ?, *Philosophy Compass* 5/10 880-90. (†)
- Le Poidevin, R. *et al* (eds.) (2009) *The Routledge Companion to Metaphysics* London: Routledge. Chapters 22 and 23. (\*)
- Laurence, S. and MacDonald, C. (eds.) (1998). *Contemporary Readings in the Foundations of Metaphysics*, Oxford: Blackwell. Part One.
- MacDonald, C. (2005). *Varieties of Things: Foundations of Contemporary Metaphysics*, Oxford: Blackwell. Chapter 2 [on order; copy in the file]
- Melia, J. (1995) On What There's Not, *Analysis* 55: 223-29. (†)
- Rayo, A. (2007) Ontological Commitment, *Philosophy Compass* 2/3: 428-44. [copy in file]
- Thomasson, A. 2008. Existence Questions, *Philosophical Studies* 141: 63-78.
- Van Inwagen, P. (1998). Meta-Ontology, *Erkenntnis* 48: 233-50.

## Selected Reading: Universals and Properties

- Armstrong, D. (1978) *Universals and Scientific Realism* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. [both volumes]
- Armstrong, D. (1989). *Universals: An Opinionated Introduction* Boulder: Westview Press. (\*)
- Armstrong, D. (1997). *A World of States of Affairs* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Aune, B. (1985). *Metaphysics: The Elements*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Chapter 3.
- Aune, B. (2002). Universals and Predication, from *The Blackwell Guide to Metaphysics* [copy in file]
- Bergmann, M. and Brower, J. (2006). A Theistic Argument Against Platonism (and in support of truthmakers and divine simplicity), *Oxford Studies in Metaphysics* 2: 357-86. [copy in file]
- Campbell, K. (1990). *Abstract Particulars* Oxford: Blackwell.
- Conee, E. and Sider, T. (2005). *Riddles of Existence* Oxford: OUP Chapter 8. [copy in file] (\*)
- Crane, T. and Farkas, K. (2004). *Metaphysics: A Guide and Anthology* Oxford: OUP. Part Four. (\*)
- Gilmore, C. (2003) In Defence of Spatially Related Universals, *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 81: 420-28.
- Heil, J. (2003). *From An Ontological Point of View*, Oxford: OUP.
- Laurence, S. and MacDonald, C. (eds.) (1998). *Contemporary Readings in the Foundations of Metaphysics*, Oxford: Blackwell. Part Three. (\*)
- Leftow, B. (2006). God and the Problem of Universals, *Oxford Studies in Metaphysics* 2: 325-56. [copy in file]
- Le Poidevin, R. *et al* (eds.) (2009) *The Routledge Companion to Metaphysics* London: Routledge. Chapter 27. (\*)
- Lewis, D. (1983). New Work for a Theory of Universals, *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 61: 343-77. (†)

- Lewis, D. (1986). *On the Plurality of Worlds* Oxford: Blackwell. Pages 50-69.
- Loux, M. (1998). *Metaphysics: A Contemporary Introduction*, London: Routledge. Chapters 1 and 2. (\*)
- Loux, M. (ed.) (2001). *Metaphysics: Contemporary Readings*, London: Routledge. Part one. (\*)
- Loux, M. and Zimmerman, D. (eds.) (2003). *The Oxford Handbook of Metaphysics*, Oxford: OUP. Part one. (†)
- Lowe, E. (1998). *The Possibility of Metaphysics*, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Lowe, E. (2002). *A Survey of Metaphysics*, Oxford: OUP. Chapters 19 and 20. (\*)
- MacBride, F. (1998). Where are Particulars and Universals? *Dialectica* 52: 203-27.
- MacBride, F. (2005). The Particular-Universal Distinction: A Dogma of Metaphysics? *Mind* 114: 565-614.
- Melia, J. (2005) Truthmaking without Truthmakers, in *Truthmakers* (ed.) Beebe and Dodd [also available at <http://www.philosophy.leeds.ac.uk/Staff/JM/Truthmaking%20without%20Truthmakers.pdf>] (†)
- Mellor, H. and Oliver, A. (eds.) (1997). *Properties* Oxford: OUP (†)
- Moreland, J. (2001) *Universals* Chesham: Acumen.
- Nolan, D. (2008). Truthmakers and Predication, *Oxford Studies in Metaphysics* 4 [accessible from <http://danielnolanphil.googlepages.com/Nolantruthpred.pdf>] (†)
- Oliver, A. (1996). The Metaphysics of Properties, *Mind* 105: 1-80. (†)
- Parsons, J. 1999. There is no 'Truthmaker' Argument Against Nominalism, *Australasian Journal of Philosophy*, 77: 325-34.
- Rodriguez-Pereyra, G. (2002). *Resemblance Nominalism*, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Van Cleve, J. (1994). Predication Without Universals? A Fling With Ostrich Nominalism, *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 54: 577-90.
- Van Inwagen, P. (2004). A Theory of Properties, *Oxford Studies in Metaphysics* 1:107-38. [copy in file] (†)
- Williams, D. (1953). On The Elements of Being I, *Review of Metaphysics* 7: 3-18.
- Zimmerman, D. (ed) (2008) *Oxford Studies in Metaphysics Volume 4 Part One* [copy in file] (†)

### **Selected Readings: Numbers**

- Armstrong, D. (1997). *A World of States of Affairs* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Chapters 11-12.
- Balaguer, M. (1998). *Platonism and Anti-Platonism in Mathematics*, Oxford: OUP.
- Benacerraf, P. (1965). What Numbers Could Not Be, *Philosophical Review* 74: 47-73.
- Bigelow, J. (1988). *The Reality of Numbers*, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Field, H. (1980). *Science Without Numbers*, Oxford: Blackwell.
- George, A and Velleman, D. (2002). *Philosophies of Mathematics*, Oxford: Blackwell. (\*)
- Hart, W. (1996). *The Philosophy of Mathematics*, Oxford: OUP.
- Jacquette, D. (ed.) (2002). *Philosophy of Mathematics*, Oxford: Blackwell.
- Laurence, S. and MacDonald, C. (eds.) (1998). *Contemporary Readings in the Foundations of Metaphysics*, Oxford: Blackwell. Part Seven. (\*)
- Le Poidevin, R. et al (eds.) (2009) *The Routledge Companion to Metaphysics* London: Routledge. Chapter 33.

- Lewis, D. (1990). *Parts of Classes*, Oxford: Blackwell.
- Putnam, H. (1972). *Philosophy of Logic*. London: George Allen & Unwin.
- Resnik, M. (1997). *Mathematics as a Science of Patterns*, Oxford: OUP.
- Shapiro, S. (1997). *Philosophy of Mathematics*, Oxford: OUP.
- Shapiro, S. (2000). *Thinking About Mathematics: The Philosophy of Mathematics*, Oxford: OUP. (\*)

### **Selected Readings: Modality and Possible Worlds**

- Armstrong, D. (1989) *A Combinatorial Theory of Possibility*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Bigelow, J. and Pargetter, R. (1990) *Science and Necessity* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. [there's something in there on island universes – I can't recall exactly where]
- Bricker, P. (1996) Isolation and Unification: The Realist Analysis of Possible Worlds, *Philosophical Studies* 84: 225-38.
- Bricker, P. (2001) Island Universes and the Analysis of Modality, from Preyer and Siebelt (eds.) *Reality and Humean Supervenience* [accessible at [http://www.umass.edu/philosophy/PDF/Bricker/Island\\_Universes.pdf](http://www.umass.edu/philosophy/PDF/Bricker/Island_Universes.pdf)]
- Bricker, P. (2006). Absolute Actuality and the Plurality of Worlds, *Philosophical Perspectives* 20: 41-76.
- Cameron, R. (2010). The Grounds of Necessity, *Philosophy Compass* 5/4, 348-58.
- deRosset, L. (2009). Possible Worlds I: Modal Realism, *Philosophy Compass* 4/6, 998-1008.
- deRosset, L. (2009). Possible Worlds II: Non-Reductive Theories of Possible Worlds, *Philosophy Compass* 4/6, 1009-1021.
- Dever, J. (2003). Modal Fictionalism and Compositionality, *Philosophical Studies* 114: 223-51.
- Divers, J. (1995) Modal Fictionalism cannot deliver possible world semantics, *Analysis* 52: 81-8.
- Divers, J. (2002) *Possible Worlds* London: Routledge. (†)
- Divers, J. (2004) Agnosticism About Other Worlds: A New Antirealist Programmer in Modality, *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 69. (†)
- Divers, J. (2006) Possible World Semantics Without Possible Worlds: The Agnostic Approach, *Mind* 115: 187-226.
- Divers, J. and Melia, J. (2002). The Analytic Limit of Genuine Modal Realism, *Mind* 111: 15-36. (†)
- Efird, D. and Stoneham, T. (2005) Genuine Modal Realism and the Empty Worlds, *European Journal of Analytic Philosophy* 1: 21-37.
- Garle, R. (2003) *Possible Worlds* Chesham: Acumen.
- Hale, B. (1995) Modal Fictionalism – a simple dilemma, *Analysis* 52: 63-7.
- Heller, M. (2003) The Immorality of Modal Realism, Or: How I learnt to stop worrying and let the children drown, *Philosophical Studies* 114: 1-22.
- Jackson, F. and Priest, G. (eds.) (2004) *Lewisian Themes*, Oxford: OUP.
- Jubien, M. (2007). Analysing Modality, *Oxford Studies in Metaphysics* 3: 99-139. [copy in file]
- Laurence, S. and MacDonald, C. (eds.) (1998). *Contemporary Readings in the Foundations of Metaphysics*, Oxford: Blackwell. Part Two. (\*)
- Le Poidevin, R. et al (eds.) (2009) *The Routledge Companion to Metaphysics* London: Routledge. Chapters 32. (\*)
- Lewis, D. (1968) Counterpart Theory and Quantified Modal Logic, *The Journal of Philosophy* 65: 113-26.

- Lewis, D. (1973). *Counterfactuals*, Oxford: Blackwell
- Lewis, D. (1986). *On the Plurality of Worlds* Oxford: Blackwell. (†)
- Loux, M. (1979) *The Possible and the Actual: Readings in the metaphysics of modality* London: Cornell University Press. (\*)
- Loux, M. (1998). *Metaphysics: A Contemporary Introduction*, London: Routledge. [relevant chapter varies depending on edition – just look for ‘The Necessary and the Possible’ chapter] (\*)
- Loux, M. (ed.) (2001). *Metaphysics: Contemporary Readings*, London: Routledge. Part Three. (\*)
- Loux, M. and Zimmerman, D. (eds.) (2003). *The Oxford Handbook of Metaphysics*, Oxford: OUP. Part three. (†)
- Lowe, E. (2002). *A Survey of Metaphysics*, Oxford: OUP. Chapters 5, 6 and 7. (\*)
- Lycan, W. (2002). The Metaphysics of Possibilia, from Gale (ed.) *The Blackwell Guide to Metaphysics* [copy in file]
- Melia, J. (2003) *Modality* Chesham: Acumen. (\*)
- Miller, R. 1993. Genuine Modal Realism: Still the only non-circular game in town. *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 71: 159-60. (†)
- Nolan, D. (2004) *David Lewis* Chesham: Acumen.
- Parsons, J. (2007) Is Everything A World?, *Philosophical Studies* 134: 165-81.
- Plantinga, A. (2003). *Essays in the Metaphysics of Modality*, Oxford: OUP.
- Preyer, G. and Siebelt, F. (des.) (2001) *Reality and Humean Supervenience*, Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers.
- Pruss, A. (2002). The Actual and the Possible, from Gale (ed.) *The Blackwell Guide to Metaphysics* [copy in file]
- Rodriguez-Pereyra, G. (2004). Modal Realism and Metaphysical Nihilism, *Mind* 113: 683-704.
- Sheehy, P. 2006. Theism and Modal Realism. *Religious Studies* 42: 315-28.
- Sider, T. (2002) The Ersatz Pluriverse, *The Journal of Philosophy* 99: 279-315. (†)
- Sider, T. et al (eds.) (2007) *Contemporary Debates in Metaphysics* Malden: Blackwell. Part Three. (\*)
- Sider, T. (MS) Beyond the Humphrey Objection [available from [http://tedsider.org/papers/counterpart\\_theory.pdf](http://tedsider.org/papers/counterpart_theory.pdf)] (†)
- Woodward, R. (2008) Why Modal Fictionalism is not Self-Defeating, *Philosophical Studies* 139: 273-88.

### **Selected Readings: Space**

Some of these readings can be very technical, which will suit some people and not others. But not everything in the philosophy of space is about physics – so if you want to do this topic but aren’t so minded to be able to read and understand a paper by Maudlin or Teller, don’t worry – just root around for something different.

- Barbour, J. and Bertotti, B. (1977). Gravity and Inertial in a Machian Framework, *Nuovo Cimentio* 38: 1-27.
- Barbour, J. and Bertotti, B. (1982). Mach’s Principle and the Structure of Dynamical Theories, *Proceedings of the Royal Society*, 382: 295-306.
- Belot, G. (1999). Rehabilitating Relationism, *International Studies in the Philosophy of Science* 13: 35-52.
- Dainton, B. (2001). *Time and Space*, Chesham: Acumen.
- Earman, J. (1989). *World Enough and Space-Time*, Massachusetts: MIT Press.
- Hooker, C. (1971). The Relational Doctrines of Space and Time, *British Journal of Philosophy of Science* 22: 97-130.
- Huggett, N. (1999). *Space from Zeno to Einstein*. (\*)

- Le Poidevin, R. (2003). *Travels in Four Dimensions*, Oxford: OUP.
- Le Poidevin, R. et al (eds.) (2009) *The Routledge Companion to Metaphysics* London: Routledge. Chapters 39 and 47.
- Loux, M. and Zimmerman, D. (eds.) (2003). *The Oxford Handbook of Metaphysics*, Oxford: OUP. Chapter 10. (\*)
- Lowe, E. (2002). *A Survey of Metaphysics*, Oxford: OUP. (esp. chapter 14) (\*)
- Maudlin, T. (1993). Buckets of water and waves of space: why spacetime is probably a substance, *Philosophy of Science* 60: 183-203.
- Nerlich, G. (1976). *The Shape of Space*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Nerlich, G. (1994). *What spacetime explains*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Nerlich, G. (2009). Incongruent Counterparts and the Reality of Space, *Philosophy Compass* 4/3, 598-613.
- Schaffer, J. (2009). Spacetime the one true substance, *Philosophical Studies* 145: 131-48.
- Sklar, L. (1992). *Philosophy of Physics*
- Skow, B. (2007). Sklar's Maneuver, *British Journal for the Philosophy of Science* 58: 777-86.
- Swinburne, R. (1981). *Space and Time*, London: Macmillan Press.
- Teller, P. (1991). Substance, relations and arguments about the nature of space-time. *The Philosophical Review* 100: 363-97.
- Trusted, J. (1991). *Physics and Metaphysics*, London: Routledge.
- van Fraassen, B. (1985). *An Introduction to the Philosophy of Time and Space* New York: Random House.

### **Selected Readings: Time**

- Armstrong, D. (2004). *Truth and Truthmakers*, Cambridge: CUP.
- Bourne, C. (2006). *A Future for Presentism*, Oxford: OUP.
- Craig, W. (2000) *The Tensed Theory of Time*, London: Kluwer.
- Craig, W. (2000) *The Tenseless Theory of Time*, London: Kluwer.
- Craig, W. (2001). *Time and the Metaphysics of Relativity*, London: Kluwer.
- Dainton, B. (2001). *Time and Space*, Chesham: Acumen
- Dainton, B. (2008). The Experience of Time and Change, *Philosophy Compass* 3/4, 619-38.
- Hare, C. (2010). Realism about Tense and Perspective, *Philosophy Compass* 5/9, 760-69.
- Le Poidevin, R. (1998). *Questions of Time and Tense*. Oxford: Clarendon.
- Le Poidevin, R. (2003). *Travels in Four Dimensions*, Oxford: OUP.
- Le Poidevin, R. et al (eds.) (2009) *The Routledge Companion to Metaphysics* London: Routledge. Chapters 47.
- Loux, M. and Zimmerman, D. (eds.) (2003). *The Oxford Handbook of Metaphysics*, Oxford: OUP. Chapter 8-9 (\*)
- Loux, M. (2006). *Metaphysics: A Contemporary Introduction 3<sup>rd</sup> Edition* Oxon: Routledge. Chapter 7. [The chapter on time might not be in previous editions]
- Lowe, E. (2002). *A Survey of Metaphysics*, Oxford: OUP. Chapter 17 (\*)
- Mellor, D. (1998). *Real Time II*, London: Routledge.
- Merricks, T. (2007). *Truth and Ontology*, Oxford: OUP. Chapter 6.
- Sider, T. (2001) *Four-Dimensionalism: An Ontology of Persistence and Time* Oxford: OUP. Chapter 2.
- Sider, T. et al (eds.) (2007) *Contemporary Debates in Metaphysics* Malden: Blackwell. Chapter 5. (\*)
- Tooley, M. (1997). *Time, Tense and Causation*, Oxford: OUP.
- Zimmerman, D. (ed.) (2004). *Oxford Studies in Metaphysics Volume I. Part one.*

## Selected Readings: Mereology

- Baker, L. (2008). A Metaphysics of Ordinary Things and Why We Need Them, *Philosophy* 83: 5-24.
- Balashov, Y. (2005) On Vagueness, 4D and Diachronic Universalism, *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 83: 523-31.
- Bigelow, J. and Pargetter, R. (2006). Real Work for Aggregates, *Dialectica* 60: 485-503.
- Bohn, E. (2009). An Argument against the necessity of unrestricted composition, *Analysis* 69: 27-31.
- Braddon-Mitchell, D. and Miller, K. (2006). Talking About a Universalist World. *Philosophical Studies* 130: 499-534. (†)
- Cameron, R. (2007). The Contingency of Composition, *Philosophical Studies* 136: 99-121.
- Carroll, J. and Carter, W. (2005). An Unstable Eliminativism, *Pacific Philosophical Quarterly* 86: 1-17.
- Comesaña, J. 2008. Could There Be Exactly Two Things?, *Synthese* 162: 31-5.
- Dorr, C. (2005) What we Disagree about when we disagree about ontology, from Kalderon (ed.) *Fictionalism in Metaphysics* [copy in file] (†)
- Effingham, N. (Forthcoming) Undermining Motivations for Universalism, *Noûs* [get it from [http://www.nikkeffingham.com/resources/Undermining Motivations for universalism.pdf](http://www.nikkeffingham.com/resources/Undermining_Motivations_for_universalism.pdf)]
- Eklund, M. (2002) Peter van Inwagen on Material Beings, *Ratio* 3: 245-56.
- Elder, C. (2008). Against Universal Mereological Composition, *dialectica* 62: 433-54.
- Goggans, P (1999) How Not to Have an Ontology of Physical Objects, *Philosophical Studies* 94: 295-308.
- Hirsch, E. (2005) Physical-Object Ontology, Verbal Disputes, and Common Sense, *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 70: 67-97. (†)
- Hudson, H. (2000) Universalism, Four Dimensionalism and Vagueness, *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 60: 547-60.
- Hudson, H. (2006). Confining Composition, *Journal of Philosophy* 103: 631-51.
- Hudson, H. (2007). Simples and Gunk, *Philosophy Compass* 2/2, 291-302.
- Korman, D. (2008). Unrestricted Composition and restricted quantification, *Philosophical Studies* 140: 319-34. (†)
- Korman, D. (2010). The Argument from Vagueness, *Philosophy Compass* 5/10, 891-901. (\*)
- Koslicki, K. (2003) The Crooked Path from Vagueness to Four-Dimensionalism, *Philosophical Studies* 114: 107-34.
- Le Poidevin, R. et al (eds.) (2009) *The Routledge Companion to Metaphysics* London: Routledge. Chapters 29. (\*)
- Mackie, P. (1993) Critical Notice: Material Beings, *Philosophical Books* 34: 75-83.
- Markosian, N. (1998) Brutal Composition, *Philosophical Studies* 92: 211-49. (\*)
- McDaniel, K. (2010). Parts and Wholes, *Philosophy Compass* 5/5, 412-25.
- Mellor, D. (2008). Micro-Composition, *Philosophy* 83: 65-80.
- Merricks, T. (2001) *Objects and Persons* Oxford: OUP. [there's also a symposium on this book in *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 67] (†)
- Merricks, T. (2005) Composition and Vagueness, *Mind* 114: 615-37. (†)
- Miller, K. (2005) Blocking the Path from Vagueness to Four Dimensionalism, *Ratio* 18: 317-31.

- Nolan, D. (2006). Vagueness, Multiplicity and Parts, *Noûs* 40: 716-37.
- Paul, L. (2010). The Puzzles of Material Constitution, *Philosophy Compass* 5/7, 579-90.
- Persson, I. (1993) Critical Study: Material Beings, *Noûs* 27: 512-18.
- Rea, M. (1998) In Defence of Mereological Universalism, *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 63: 347-60.
- Rosen, G. and Dorr, C. (2002) Composition as Fiction, from Gale (ed.) *The Blackwell Guide to Metaphysics*, p. 151-74 [copy in file] (†)
- Sider, T. *et al* (eds.) (2007) *Contemporary Debates in Metaphysics* Malden: Blackwell. Chapter 8. (\*)
- Smith, D. (2006). The Vagueness Argument for Mereological Universalism. *Pacific Philosophical Quarterly* 87: 357-68.
- Smith, N. (2005). A Plea for things that are no quite all there: Or, is there a problem about vague composition and vague existence? *The Journal of Philosophy* 52: 381-421.
- Thomasson, A. (2010). The Controversy over the existence of ordinary objects, *Philosophy Compass* 5/7, 591-601.
- Vander Laan, D. (Forthcoming). A Relevance Constraint on Composition, *Australasian journal of Philosophy*.
- Van Inwagen, P. (1990). *Material Beings* Ithaca: Cornell University Press. (\*)
- Williams, R. (2006). Illusions of Gunk, *Philosophical Perspectives* 20: 494-513.

### **Selected Readings: Persistence**

- Balashov, Y. (1999). Relativistic Objects, *Noûs* 33: 644-62.
- Baxter, D. (1988) Identity in the Loose and Popular Sense, *Mind* 97: 575-82.
- Burke, M. (1992) Copper Statues and pieces of copper: A challenge to the standard account, *Analysis* 52: 12-17. (\*)
- Burke, M. (1994) Preserving the Principle of One Object to a Place: A Novel Account of the Relations Among Objects, Sorts, Sortals, and Persistence Conditions, *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 54: 591-624. (\*)
- Carter, W. (1997) Dion's Left Foot (and the Price of Burkean Economy), *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 57.
- Chisholm, R. (1973) Parts As Essential To Their Wholes, *The Review of Metaphysics* 26: 581-603.
- Effingham, N. and Robson, J. (2007) A Mereological Challenge to Endurantism, *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 85: 633-40.
- Gilmore, C. (2007) Time Travel, Coinciding Objects and Persistence, *Oxford Studies in Metaphysics* 3. [available at <http://www.unomaha.edu/philosophy/TTCOandPmay05.pdf>]
- Gilmore, C. (2009). Persistence and Location in Relativistic Spacetime, *Philosophy Compass* 3/6, 1224-54.
- Haslanger, S. (1989) Endurance and Temporary Intrinsic, *Analysis* 49: 119-25.
- Hawley, K. (2001) *How Things Persist* Oxford: Clarendon. (\*)
- Heller, M. (1991) *The Ontology of Physical Objects: Four-dimensional hunks of matter*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Heller, M. (1992) Things Change, *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 52.
- Heller, M. (1993) Varieties of Four Dimensionalism, *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 71: 47-59.
- Le Poidevin, R. *et al* (eds.) (2009) *The Routledge Companion to Metaphysics* London: Routledge. Chapters 29.
- Levey, S. (1997) Coincidence and Principles of Composition, *Analysis* 57: 3-9.

- Loux, M. (1998). *Metaphysics: A Contemporary Introduction*, London: Routledge. [Specific chapter varies between editions] (\*)
- Loux, M. (ed.) (2001). *Metaphysics: Contemporary Readings*, London: Routledge. Part Five. (\*)
- Loux, M. and Zimmerman, D. (eds.) (2003). *The Oxford Handbook of Metaphysics*, Oxford: OUP. Chapter 11. (\*)
- Lowe, E. (1995) Coinciding Objects: In Defence of the ‘Standard Account’, *Analysis* 55: 171-78.
- Lowe, E. (2002). *A Survey of Metaphysics*, Oxford: OUP. Chapters 2, 3 and 4. (\*)
- McCall, S. and Lowe, E. (2006). The 3D/4D Controversy: A Storm in a Teacup. *Noûs* 40: 570-8. (†)
- McGrath, M. (2007). Temporal Parts, *Philosophy Compass* 2: 730-48. (\*)
- Moyer, M. (2008). Why We Shouldn’t Swallow Worm Slices: A Case Study in Semantic Accommodation, *Noûs* 42: 109-38. (†)
- Parsons, J. (2005) I Have Not Now, Nor Have I Ever Been, A Turnip, *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 83: 1-14.
- Rea, M. (ed.) (1997). *Material Constitution*, Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield. (\*)
- Sidelle, A. (1998) A Sweater Unravelling: Following One Thread of Thought for Avoiding Coincident Entities, *Noûs* 32: 423-48.
- Sider, T. (2001) *Four-Dimensionalism: An Ontology of Persistence and Time* Oxford: OUP [there’s also a symposium on this book in *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 68] (\*)
- Sider, T. et al (eds.) (2007) *Contemporary Debates in Metaphysics* Malden: Blackwell. Chapter 6. (\*)
- Thomson, J. (1983) Parthood and Identity Across Time, *The Journal of Philosophy* 80: 201-220.
- Thomson, J. (1998) The Statue and the Clay, *Noûs* 32: 149-73.
- Wasserman, R. (2003) The Argument from Temporary Intrinsics, *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 81: 413-19.
- Wasserman, R., Hawthorne, J. and Scala, M. (2004) Recombination, Causal Constraints and Humean Supervenience: An Argument for Temporal Parts?, *Oxford Studies in Metaphysics* 1: 301-18. [available at [http://myweb.facstaff.wvu.edu/wasserr/papers/recombination\\_web.pdf](http://myweb.facstaff.wvu.edu/wasserr/papers/recombination_web.pdf)]
- Wasserman, R. (2004) The Constitution Question, *Noûs* 38: 693-710.
- Wasserman, R. (2006). The Problem of Change, *Philosophy Compass* 1/1, 48-57.
- Wiggins, D. (1969) On Being in the same place at the same time, *Philosophical Review* 77: 90-5.
- Wiggins, D. (2001) *Sameness and Substance Renewed* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

## **Selected Readings Lesser Kinds**

### *Holes*

- Casati, R. and Varzi, A. (1994) *Holes and other superficialities* London: MIT Press. (\*)
- Jackson, F. (1977) *Perception: A Representative Theory*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press [his discussion of paraphrasing is somewhere in there]
- Jackson, F. and Priest, G. (eds.) (2004) *Lewisian Themes*, Oxford: OUP. Chapter 2. (\*)
- Le Poidevin, R. et al (eds.) (2009) *The Routledge Companion to Metaphysics* London: Routledge. Chapters 36. (\*)
- Lewis, D. and Lewis, S. (1970). Holes, *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 48: 206-12. (\*)
- Lewis, D. and Lewis, S. (1996) Review of Holes and other superficialities, *Philosophical Review* 105: 77-79. (\*)

Martin, C. (1996). How It Is: Entities, Absences and Voids, *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 74: 57-65.

Miller, K. (2007) Immaterial Beings, *Monist* 90. (†)

Wake, A., Spencer, J. and Fowler, G. (2007). Holes as Regions of Spacetime, *Monist* 90. (†)

### *Groups*

Cameron, R. (2008). There are no things that are musical works, *British Journal of Aesthetics* 48: 295-314. [not a typo, this does deal with groups near the end] (†)

Effingham, N. (2010) The Metaphysics of Groups, *Philosophical Studies* 149: 251-67. (†)

Le Poidevin, R. *et al* (eds.) (2009) *The Routledge Companion to Metaphysics* London: Routledge. Chapters 51. (\*)

López De Sa, D. (2007). The Chief Supreme Court Justice: A Metaphysical Puzzle?, *Critica* 39: 61-8.

Uzquiano, G. (2004). The Supreme Court and the Supreme Court Justices: A Metaphysical Puzzle. *Noûs* 38: 135-53. (\*)

### *Musical Works*

Cameron, R. (2008). There are no things that are musical works, *British Journal of Aesthetics* 48: 295-314. (†)

Caplan, B. and Matheson, C. (2004). Can A Musical Work be Created? *British Journal of Aesthetics* 44: 113-34. (†)

Caplan, B. and Matheson, C. (2006) Defending Musical Perdurantism *British Journal of Aesthetics* 46: 59-69 (†)

Caplan, B. and Matheson, C. (2008). Defending 'Defending Musical Perdurantism', *British Journal of Aesthetics* 48: 80-85.

Dodd, J. (2000). Musical Works as Eternal Types. *British Journal of Aesthetics* 40: 424-40.

Dodd, J. (2002). Defending Musical Platonism. *British Journal of Aesthetics* 42: 380-402.

Dodd, J. (2004). Types, Continuants, and the Ontology of Music. *British Journal of Aesthetics* 44: 342-60.

Dodd, J. (2008). Musical Works: Ontology and Meta-Ontology, *Philosophy Compass* 3/6, 1113-34. (\*)

Kania, A. (2006). Making Tracks: The Ontology of Rock Music, *The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* 64: 401-14.

Kania, A. (2008). The Methodology of Musical Ontology: Descriptivism and its implications, *British Journal of Aesthetics* 48: 426-44.

Kania, A. (2008.) Piece for the end of time: In defense of musical ontology, *British Journal of Aesthetics* 48: 65-79.

Kivy, P. (ed.) (2004) *The Blackwell Guide to Aesthetics* Oxford: Blackwell. Chapter 4.

Lamarque, P. (2002) Work and Object, *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* 102: 141-62.

Levinson, J. (ed.) (2003) *The Oxford Handbook of Aesthetics* Oxford: OUP. Chapter 8.

McDaniel, K. *The Monads* (<http://tinyurl.com/ye3nrk4>) [not actually research, or even helpful, but still quite cool]

Rohrbaugh, G. (2003). Artworks as Historical Individuals. *European Journal of Philosophy* 11: 177-205.

### *Other Lesser Kinds*

Crane, J. (2004). On the Metaphysics of Species, *Philosophy of Science* 71: 156-73.

Dokic, J. (2007). Two Ontologies of Sound, *The Monist* 90: 391-402.

Reydon, T. (2003). Species are Individuals – Or Are They?, *Philosophy of Science* 70: 49-56.

Smith, B. and Zaibert, J. (2001). The Metaphysics of Real Estate, *Topoi* 20: 161-72.

## 7. SEMINAR QUESTIONS

Seminars are *exclusively* for those students who are prepared and ready to debate the appropriate topic. To this end *every* student must turn up with written notes ready for discussion. These should be an A4 typed sheet or equivalent (but why hold back? If you have more to say, write more! Particularly as your notes made at this stage can be used for later reference when it comes to writing the essay).

These notes can be on any issue, or issues, relevant to the topic for discussion. However, I have included study questions relating to the set readings. **These are only for your use if you want** – if you'd rather concentrate on a particular topic not covered by the questions, or alternatively only concentrate on a small handful of the questions, feel free to do so. So answering all of the questions is not obligatory (although I hope that answering the questions will aid in understanding the texts, so double as a study aid).

This also means that, in weeks where it is appropriate to do so, you can concentrate on just one of the set readings if that is what you want to do. Whilst you should be basically familiar with each piece, if you turn up with a *thorough* understanding of one piece at the cost of getting to grips with every details of the other pieces, that's fine. However, to repeat: you should be familiar with the basics of each piece of set reading, particularly as I will build on some of the concepts in later lectures.

One final note – with 15 hours devoted to seminar preparation per week, you can't possibly prepare in one sitting. You should be reading the set readings over the two week period, and therefore (if you use them) answering the questions over a two-week period.

### Seminar One: Universals and Properties

#### *Quine*

- (1) What is the problem of Plato's beard?
- (2) What's wrong with saying that things like unicorns are ideas your the head?
- (3) Why does Quine introduce Russell's definite descriptions? Why is this so useful to his proposed theory of ontological commitment?
- (4) What do you think when Quine says "I feel no reluctance toward refusing to admit meanings, for I do not thereby deny that words and statements are meaningful." (p. 30)
- (5) What's going on in the second paragraph of p. 32? In your opinion, does this drive us towards nominalism or realism about universals?

#### *Armstrong*

- (6) Who, according to Armstrong, will find uninstantiated universals repugnant? What is Armstrong's alternative?
- (7) Does Armstrong agree with Quine's 'McX' that 'meanings' are universals? Why does he have that position?
- (8) What other arguments does Armstrong discuss for (uninstantiated) universals?
- (9) What is a *disjunctive* universal? Why does Armstrong deny their existence? What about *negative* universals?

- (10) What is a state of affairs? Why does Armstrong believe we need them? Is it a good reason?
- (11) What is John Quilter's problem? How does Armstrong solve it?
- (12) Where do you think universals are located? What does Armstrong say?
- (13) What does Armstrong have to say about sentences like 'Red is more like orange than blue'?

*Jackson*

- (14) What is Prior's standard objection to the austere nominalist paraphrase of 'Red is a colour'?
- (15) What could the nominalist say in retort? What is Jackson's counterargument to that retort?
- (16) Can the nominalist find a suitable paraphrase for 'Red is a colour'?

### **Seminar Two: Possible Worlds**

*Lewis*

- (1) What is Lewis's argument for possible worlds? Why does he think it is justified to think the conclusion is true in this case?
- (2) What alternatives does Lewis consider to thinking our modal idioms quantify over possible worlds? Why does he think these alternative are wrong?
- (3) What does Lewis think about the word 'actual'? What other doctrines does he compare it to?
- (4) What types of parsimony are there? How is this relevant to Lewis's view on possible worlds?
- (5) What Quine-inspired *ersatz* theory does Lewis consider? Why does Lewis reject it?

*Stalnaker*

- (6) What are the four theses that Stalnaker identifies Lewis as holding?
- (7) What problem(s) does Stalnaker have with Lewis's argument for the first thesis and that argument committing one to genuine modal realism?
- (8) What problem(s) does Stalnaker have with Lewis's argument for the third thesis and that argument committing one to genuine modal realism?
- (9) One p. 108-9, what problem does Stalnaker raise?
- (10) What is Adam's *ersatz* theory of possible worlds?
- (11) Stalnaker discusses the general methodology of analysis. What does he say, and how does it bear on Adam's theory?
- (12) Are there any other problems Stalnaker raises for Adams' theory that you find striking?

*Rosen*

- (13) In brief, what is Rosen's deflationist strategy?
- (14) Does modal fictionalism have any unwanted ontological commitments?

- (15) What epistemological worry does Rosen raise in §6? How does modal fictionalism fare with regards to these worries?
- (16) What is the incompleteness problem? Can the modal fictionalist avoid it?
- (17) Is modal fictionalism committed to primitive modality? Is this a problem?

### **Seminar Three: Space**

*Kant*

- (1) Define chirality; congruent; incongruent; Möbius strip.
- (2) Reconstruct, as best you can, the argument Kant uses for there being absolute space. Try and do this from the original, rather than relying on the commentary – you might be pleasantly surprised to see differences between the two.
- (3) Could chiral properties be intrinsic properties?
- (4) Could chiral properties be the result of properties extrinsic to something other than space?
- (5) Could a hand fail to be either left or right?

### **Seminar Four: Mereology**

*Markosian*

- (1) What are the four points Markosian gives in favour of universalism? Do you find them particularly beneficial?
- (2) Is it counterintuitive to think there is an object composed of just you and Jupiter? Is there any way that the universalist might avoid such counterintutions if there are some?
- (3) What is ‘ontological innocence’? Do you think composition is ‘innocent’?
- (4) Why does Markosian think we should not be nihilists? Are these good reasons?
- (5) Are *Contact*, *Fastenation* or any similar answer a good answer to the Special Composition Question?
- (6) What are the upsides and downsides of saying composition is ‘brute’? Do you think they are good reasons?
- (7) Is *Mystery* just a cop-out?

*Sider – Four Dimensionalism extract*

- (8) Briefly recap Sider’s vagueness argument.
- (9) Do you think it could be vague whether some given thing exists? If so, why so. If not, why not?
- (10) Do you think it is plausible that there could be ‘sharp cut off points’ in composition? If so, why so? If not, why not?

*Sider – Analysis paper*

- (11) What is gunk and why does it pose nihilism a problem?
- (12) What *arguments* does Sider give for thinking that there could be gunk? Are they good arguments?

### **Seminar Five: Persistence**

*Olson*

- (1) What is the problem of the statue and the clay?
- (2) What is the Popular View? What is the problem with it?
- (3) What are the conservative solutions? Why should we avoid them?
- (4) What's a temporal part?
- (5) Why do temporal parts have radical consequences according to Olson? Is he right?
- (6) What is it for identity to be relative? Is identity relative?
- (7) What is 'eliminativism'? What problems does Olson identify with it?
- (8) Is the standard account the same as Olson's Popular View?

*Wasserman*

- (9) What is the standard objection to the standard account?
- (10) Does it work?
- (11) According to Wasserman, does perdurantism do any better than the standard account at avoiding the standard objection?
- (12) Where does that leave perdurantism in your view?