

DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY
School of Philosophy, Theology & Religion
UNIVERSITY OF BIRMINGHAM

Knowledge and Reality A
Banner code: PHIL 0821260

10 Credits

MODULE GUIDE
2010/2011

This module outline **must** be read in conjunction with the relevant sections of *The Philosopher's Stone* and the *Philosophy Study Guide*, available from the Philosophy Office (room 109).

MOMD and Erasmus students should pick up a student pack (including the *Stone* and the *Philosophy Study Guide*) from the Philosophy Office. Erasmus students, please note that your attendance and assessment requirements are exactly the same as for all other students on this module. Please see the *Philosopher's Stone* for more information.

1. GENERAL INFORMATION

Module convenor: Nikk Effingham
Office number: 114
Email: N.Effingham@bham.ac.uk
Office hours: Wednesday 2-3, Friday 1-2

Semester: One
Credit rating: 10
Level: C

Tutor: Seminars for this module will be taken by a tutor, who is a Postgraduate Teaching Assistant in the Department:

Kirk Surgener
E-mail: KXS675@bham.ac.uk
Naomi Thompson
E-mail: NXT915@bham.ac.uk

Seminar tutors do not have office hours; however, your seminar tutor will be very happy to talk to you about any aspect of this module by appointment. Please email him or her (or speak to him or her before or after your seminar) to arrange a place and time to meet.

2. ABOUT THE MODULE

MODULE SUMMARY

The first half of the module (Knowledge and Reality A) introduces students to some central topics and issues in epistemology. These will include some of: the definition of knowledge; scepticism; internalism vs externalism about justification; coherentism vs foundationalism about justification; perception; the problem of induction. The second half of the module (Knowledge and Reality B) introduces students to some central topics and issues in metaphysics. These will include some of: the existence of God; the problem of free will; the mind and body; the nature and existence of universals; personal identity; time; the problem of change; causation; laws of nature. The emphasis will be on the critical analysis and evaluation of the philosophical positions and arguments, so that students receive a grounding not only in topics in epistemology and metaphysics but in the methods of analytical philosophy more generally.

3. MODULE ORGANISATION

Lectures: Friday 11-12, Watson Building Number R15 Lecture Theatre A Ground Floor Room G23. There will be **no lecture** during Reading Week (week 6).

Seminars: Seminars are fortnightly, starting in week 2 or week 3. Attendance at seminars is compulsory. Seminar groups and times will be arranged during the first lecture of this module, in week 1. It is your responsibility to ensure that you have been allocated to a seminar group; if you do not get assigned to a group, or if you cannot make the time you have been allocated to, please see Janet Elwell in room 109 as soon as possible. **You may not change seminar group without Janet's permission.** Students who attend the wrong seminar group will be marked absent.

If you have seminars on even weeks, **there will be a seminar during Reading Week.**

Work and attendance

The work and attendance requirements for this course are that you:

- **Attend all seminars.** If you are absent from a seminar through illness or for any other reason, you should inform the tutor as soon as possible – if possible, *before* the class.
- **Prepare adequately for seminars** as directed by your tutor or the module convenor. Only students who have prepared adequately may attend seminars. Students who do not turn up with *written answers* to the seminar questions, or who do not come with the required reading to refer to, will be asked to leave the seminar. Students must also come with all required reading (such as the book, and any articles that need to be printed out or collected from a lecture in which they are distributed).
- **Complete written work on time:** Failure to complete assessed work by the due date constitutes a violation of the work and attendance requirements.

Persistent violations of work and attendance requirements will be reported to the Senior Tutor. If you have difficulties (e.g. personal, financial or family problems) that result in persistent failure to meet the work and attendance requirements, you should talk to your academic tutor or the Welfare Tutor.

Students are required by University regulations to display 'due diligence'. Failure to do so may result in your being barred from assessment, which can lead ultimately to exclusion from your degree programme.

Study budget

The University's Code of Practice specifies that a 10-credit module is expected to require about 100 hours work by students.

For this module, you are recommended to break this down roughly as follows:

Lectures	10 hours
Seminars	5 hours
Preparation for seminars	5 x 6 hours = 30 hours
Writing up seminar/lecture notes	15 hours
Essay preparation	20 hours
Exam preparation	20 hours
TOTAL:	100

Prompt arrival at classes

Students should note that all classes in the University start **on the hour** and should end at 50 minutes past the hour. Late arrival at seminars may result in your being marked absent; if you arrive late it is your responsibility to ensure that your presence has been noted.

4. ASSESSMENT

The assessment for this module is as follows:

This module is jointly assessed with Knowledge and Reality B: Metaphysics. The contribution of the assessment for this module to the total overall mark for both modules is: (a) One 1500-word essay (25%) and (b) one exam question in a 90-minute exam (25%).

ASSESSMENT CRITERIA

For the Philosophy Department's assessment criteria and guidance on how to meet them, see the *Philosophy Study Guide*.

ASSESSED ESSAYS

One essay of 1500 words (the essay title is: Evaluate one philosophical theory that tries to deal with Agrippa's Trilemma.)

Presentation

Essays must be typed in at least 12 point in a readable font, with wide margins and page numbers, and should **not** be single spaced. They should include proper bibliography and references; **marks will be deducted for inadequate referencing/bibliography**. See the *Study Guide* for guidelines and the *Philosopher's Stone* for information about penalties.

Failure to provide adequate referencing can amount to plagiarism. Plagiarism is a form of cheating and can lead to exclusion from your degree programme. Please see the *Study Guide* for guidance on avoiding plagiarism and the *Philosopher's Stone* for information about how cases of plagiarism are dealt with.

Word limit

Your essay **MUST NOT** exceed the word limit stated above. **You must state the exact number of words used (excluding bibliography) at the end of the main text of your essay, and again on the essay submission form.** If you fail to do this, your essay may be returned to you so that you can add this information, and this may significantly delay the marking process.

See the *Philosopher's Stone* for more information about the word limits and penalties for exceeding them.

Deadline

The essay must be handed in by Tuesday, 23rd November at 12.30pm.

See the *Philosopher's Stone* for information about the granting of extensions and penalties for unexcused late submission. Late submissions for which no extension has been granted will be penalised at a rate of 5 marks per day.

Handing in your essay

You must hand **two copies** of your essay by 12.30pm on the due date, to the Philosophy Office. An essay submission form must be included with your essay; you can fill this in when you submit your essay. See the *Philosopher's Stone* for more information about essay hand-ins.

Uploading your essay to turnitinUK

You must upload your essay to turnitinUK prior to handing in the hard copies – this is done via WebCT (See the *Philosopher's Stone* for more information). You will be asked to tick a box confirming this on the essay submission form, and your essay will not be accepted unless you have ticked the box (or attach the form excusing you from this, signed by the Department's plagiarism officer). The essay you submit in hard copy **MUST** be exactly the same as the one you upload to turnitinUK.

Return of assessed essays

A report on your first assessed essay should be available by 11th January, 2009 provided the essay is submitted on time. You will receive an email (to your bham.ac.uk account) as soon as your essay is available to pick up from the Philosophy Office; please **do not try to pick up your essay before you have received the email.**

Please note that all essay marks are provisional until confirmed by the Board of Examiners in June. Note also that you are **NOT** entitled to question the academic judgement of the person marking your essay. If you are unhappy with your mark, you should make an appointment with the member of staff who marked the essay to discuss your performance. If you are still not satisfied, you can raise the issue with the Head of Department, who may then arrange for a second member of staff to look at the essay. The HoD will not do this unless you have already discussed your essay with the person who marked it.

Students are welcome to discuss their essay with the module convenor or their academic tutor during office hours.

ESSAY TITLES

There is only one essay title:

- (1) Evaluate one philosophical theory that tries to deal with Agrippa's Trilemma.

EXAMINATION

This module is jointly assessed with Knowledge and Reality B. One 90-minute exam will be set during the May/June examination period, in which you must answer ONE question for this module and ONE question for Knowledge and Reality B.

The examination component for Knowledge and Reality A will *only* cover the second half of the course (topic four and five). The final lecture will go into more detail on the examination content, and how to prepare.

Past examination papers will be available at www.exampapers.bham.ac.uk. Please note that these are provided **only** for guidance as to the kind of question you may be asked. You should not infer anything about which particular questions or topics will come up in this year's exam.

5. OUTLINE OF THE MODULE

Semester 1

Week 1 (beginning 4 Oct):	Analysing Knowledge I: Introduction to Epistemology
Week 2 (beginning 11 Oct):	Analysing Knowledge II: Gettier Cases
Week 3 (beginning 18 Oct):	Justification
Week 4 (beginning 25 Oct):	Skills I: Research Methods
Week 5 (beginning 1 Nov):	Skills II: Essay Writing

WEEK 6 (beginning 8 November): READING WEEK (no lectures)

Week 7 (beginning 15 Nov):	Paradoxes I: Rationality
Week 8 (beginning 22 Nov):	Induction I: Hume on Induction
Week 9 (beginning 29 Nov):	Induction II: The Problem of Other Minds
Week 10 (beginning 6 Dec):	The <i>a priori</i>
Week 11 (beginning 13 Dec):	Scepticism

Seminar topics

Topic One (week2/3): Gettier Examples

Pritchard, D. (2006) *What is this thing called knowledge?* London: Routledge. Chapter 1 and 3.

Gettier, E. (1963). 'Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?', *Analysis* 23, 121-3. [you must download this via the eLibrary]

Clark, M. (1963). 'Knowledge and Grounds: A Comment on Mr. Gettier's Paper', *Analysis* 24, 46-8. [you must download this via the eLibrary]

Using the eLibrary is dealt with in the library induction. If you failed to attend, a guide is available here:

<http://www.library.bham.ac.uk/searching/guides/g31eLibraryQuick.pdf>

Remember that, to find an article, you need to search for the *journal* name (in this case ‘Analysis’) not the article name. Alternatively, if you’re on campus, you can use Google Scholar (*not* regular Google) and search for the article name. That will provide you with a link that will take you straight to the articles.

Topic Two (week 4/5): Justification

Pritchard, D. (2006) *What is this thing called knowledge?* London: Routledge. Chapters 4 – 6.

Topic Three (week 6/7): Skills Seminar

There is no set reading for this seminar. Instead, you are required to (i) download the Mock Essay from WebCT, redraft that essay as if it were your own, print it out and take it to the seminar to discuss with your group and (ii) take your prepared essay plan to discuss with the group.

Topic Four (week 8/9): Paradoxes

Sainsbury, R. (2009) *Paradoxes: Third Edition* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Chapter 4 [available as a handout in the first lecture]

Topic Five (week 10/11): Induction

Pritchard, D. (2006) *What is this thing called knowledge?* London: Routledge. Chapter 10 and 11.

Malcolm, N. (1958) ‘Knowledge of Other Minds’, *Journal of Philosophy* 55, 969-78. [you must download this via the eLibrary]

6. READING LIST

Compulsory purchase: You must buy:

Pritchard, D. (2006) *What is this thing called knowledge?* London: Routledge

The reading for week 8/9 will be distributed in the first lecture. Finally, you will need to print off articles from the eLibrary, as listed above.

Reading list

What follows is a reading list for the various topics we shall cover on this course. All texts can be found either in the library or online. In each case, I offer a selection of introductory chapters that you might wish to refer to, and then a selection of articles that you might wish to study. I recommend a mixture of the two – reading introductory chapters *ad nauseum* is unlikely to prove fruitful. Text marked with an asterisk (*) are tougher and more challenging. In addition you may find the following to be a useful reference book:

Dancy, J. and Sosa, E. (eds.) (1992) *A Companion to Epistemology* Oxford: Blackwell.

Justification

The following textbooks have introductory chapters on Foundationalism.

Audi, R. (1998) *Epistemology: A contemporary introduction to the theory of knowledge* London, Routledge. Ch. 7.

Dancy, J. (1985) *Introduction To Contemporary Epistemology* Oxford, Blackwell. Ch 4-5, 8-9.

Everitt, N. and Fisher, A. (1995) *Modern Epistemology: A New Introduction* London: McGraw-Hill, Inc. Ch. 5-8.

Lehrer, K. (2000) *Theory of Knowledge* Boulder: Westview Press. ch. 3-8.

- Morton, A. (2002) *A Guide Through The Theory of Knowledge* Oxford: Blackwell. Ch. 7.
- Moser, P. (2002) *The Oxford Handbook of Epistemology* Oxford: OUP. Chapters 7 and 9.
- O'Brien, D. (2006) *The Theory of Knowledge* Cambridge: Polity Press. ch. 6-8.
- Pollock, J. and Cruz, J. (1999) *Contemporary Theories of Knowledge* Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. Ch. 2-4.
- Williams, M. (2001) *Problem of Knowledge* Oxford: OUP. Ch. 7-8, 10-11.
- Wood, J. (1998) *Epistemology: Becoming Intellectually Virtuous* Leicester: Apollos. Ch. 4-6.

The following papers/collections may be of help (NB: there is some crossover with coherentism):

- Alston, W. (1976) 'Has Foundationalism Been Refuted?', *Philosophical Studies* 29, 287-305.
- Alston, W. (1998) 'Internalism and Externalism in Epistemology', *Philosophical Topics*, 124 reprinted in Alcoff (ed.) *Epistemology: The Big Questions* Oxford: Blackwell.
- Bernecker, S. and Dretske, F. (2000) *Knowledge: Readings in Contemporary Epistemology* Oxford: OUP. Ch. 12, 17-19.
- Bernecker, S. (ed.) (2006) *Reading Epistemology* Oxford: Blackwell. Chapters 2, 3 and 5.
- Bonjour, L. (1978) 'Can Empirical Belief have a Foundation?', *American Philosophical Quarterly* 15, 1-13.
- Bonjour, L. (1986) *The Structure of Empirical Knowledge* London: Harvard University Press. Ch. 5
- Bonjour, L. (1999) 'The Dialectic of Foundationalism and Coherentism', in Greco, J. and Sosa, E. (eds.) *The Blackwell Guide to Epistemology* Oxford: Blackwell, 117-42.
- Bonjour, L. (2002) 'Internalism and Externalism', in Moser, P. (ed.) *The Oxford Handbook of Epistemology* Oxford: OUP, 234-63.
- Chisholm, R. (1983) 'The Myth of the Given', *The Foundations of Knowing* reprinted in Alcoff (ed.) *Epistemology: The Big Questions* Oxford: Blackwell, 169-86.
- Fumerton, R. (1976) 'Inferential Justification and Empiricism', *Journal of Philosophy* 73, 557-69.
- Fumerton, R. (2002) 'Conditions and Analyses of Knowing', in Moser, P. (ed.) *The Oxford Handbook of Epistemology* Oxford: OUP, 204-33.
- Fumerton, R. (2005) 'Foundationalist Theories of Epistemic Justification', *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (available online)
- Goldman, A. (1979) 'What is Justified Belief', in Pappas G. (ed.), *Justification and Knowledge*. Holland: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1-23.
- Huemer, M. (ed.) (2002) *Epistemology: Contemporary Readings* London: Routledge. Ch. 7.
- Kornblith, H. (2001) *Epistemology: Internalism and Externalism* Oxford: Blackwell.
- Kvanvig, J. (2007) 'Coherentist Theories of Epistemic Justification', *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (available online)
- Pappas, G. (2005) 'Internalist vs. Externalist Conceptions of Epistemic Justification', *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* [available on-line]
- (*) Sellars, W. (1963) *Science, Perception and Reality*. London: Routledge. Ch. 5.
- Sosa, E. and Kim, J. (eds.) (2000) *Epistemology: An Anthology* Blackwell: Oxford. Ch. 7-8, 12-15, 21.
- Sosa, E. et al (eds.) (2008) *Epistemology: An Anthology 2nd edition* Blackwell: Oxford. Part 5 and 6.
- (*) Steup, M. and Sosa, E. (2005) *Contemporary Debates in Epistemology* Oxford: Blackwell. Ch. 6-7.

Paradoxes

There is a bibliography given in the required reading (kindly, I've photocopied the book's bibliography with it), although a lot of it is quite hard. Indeed, a lot of the literature on this topic is quite hard. But that's fine, because for this topic in particular we're specifically interested in your

own reaction to the material. So, by all means do some further reading, but your own ideas are just as good for this topic.

Induction

The following textbooks have introductory chapters on the problem of induction:

- Dancy, J. (1985) *Introduction To Contemporary Epistemology* Oxford, Blackwell. Ch 13.
- Everitt, N. and Fisher, A. (1995) *Modern Epistemology: A New Introduction* London, McGraw-Hill, Inc. Ch. 10.
- Ladyman, J. (2002) *Understanding Philosophy of Science* London, Routledge. Ch. 2-3.
- Morton, A. (1977) *A Guide Through the Theory of Knowledge* Oxford, Blackwell. Ch. 4.
- O'Brien, D. (2006) *The Theory of Knowledge* Cambridge, Polity Press. Ch. 10.
- Pollock, J. and Cruz, J. (1999) *Contemporary Theories of Knowledge* Oxford, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. Ch. 3.
- Pritchard, D. (2006) *What is this thing called knowledge?* Abingdon, Routledge. Ch. 10.
- Schlesinger, G. (1983) *Metaphysics* Oxford: Blackwell. Ch. 8.
- Williams, M. (2001) *Problem of Knowledge* Oxford, OUP. Ch. 17.

The following papers/collections may be of help:

- Bernecker, S. and Dretske, F. (2000) *Knowledge: Readings in Contemporary Epistemology* Oxford, OUP. Ch. 37-39.
- Edwards, P. (1949) 'Russell's Doubts about induction', *Mind* 58, 141-63.
- Huemer, M. and Audi, R. (2002) *Epistemology: Contemporary Readings* London, Routledge. Ch. 6.
- Hume, D. (1975) *An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding* Oxford, Clarendon Press. § IV, § V part one.
- Popper, K. (1972) *Objective Knowledge* Oxford, Clarendon Press. Ch. 1.
- Russell, B. (1967) *The Problems of Philosophy* Oxford, OUP. Ch. 6-7.
- Salmon, W. (1967) 'The Problem of Induction', in *The Foundations of Scientific Inference* reprinted in Perry and Bratman (eds.) *Introduction to Philosophy: Classical and Contemporary Readings* Oxford: OUP.
- (*) Vickers, J. (2006) 'The Problem of Induction', *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (available online)

Other Minds

The following textbooks have introductory chapters on the problem of other minds:

- Dancy, J. (1985) *Introduction To Contemporary Epistemology* Oxford, Blackwell. Ch 5.
- Landesman, C. (1997) *An Introduction to Epistemology* Oxford: Blackwell. Ch. 6.
- Morton, A. (2002) *A Guide Through The Theory of Knowledge* Oxford: Blackwell. Ch. 8.
- O'Brien, D. (2006) *The Theory of Knowledge* Cambridge, Polity Press. Ch. 13.
- Schlesinger, G. (1983) *Metaphysics* Oxford: Blackwell. Ch. 7.

The following papers/collections may be of help:

- Austin, J. (1961) *Philosophical Papers* Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- (*) Burge, T. (1998) 'Computer proof, a priori knowledge and other minds', *Philosophical Perspectives* 12, 1-37.
- Dancy, J. and Sosa, E. (1992) *A Companion to Epistemology* Oxford: Blackwell, p. 317-23.
- Hyslop, A. (2005) 'Other Minds', *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (available online)

***A priori* knowledge**

The following textbooks have introductory chapters on *a priori* knowledge and naturalised epistemology:

- Dancy, J. (1985) *Introduction to Contemporary Epistemology* Oxford, Blackwell. Ch. 13.
- Everitt, N. and Fisher, A. (1995) *Modern Epistemology: A New Introduction* London, McGraw-Hill, Inc. Ch. 12.
- Landesman, C. (1997) *An Introduction to Epistemology* Oxford: Blackwell. Ch. 6.
- Morton, A. (1977) *A Guide Through the Theory of Knowledge* Oxford, Blackwell. Ch. 3.
- O'Brien, D. (2006) *The Theory of Knowledge* Cambridge, Polity Press. Ch. 3 and 11.
- Pritchard, D. (2006) *What is this thing called knowledge?* London: Routledge. Ch 9.

The following papers/collections may be of help:

- Bernecker, S. and Dretske, F. (2000) *Knowledge: Readings in Contemporary Epistemology* Oxford, OUP. Ch. 40-41.
- Boghossian, P. and Peacocke, C. (2000) *New Essays on the A Priori* Oxford: OUP [Warning: I've never actually read this, so not sure how suitable the essays are – but you might want to give it a punt]
- Huemer, M. and Audi, R. (2002) *Epistemology: Contemporary Readings* London, Routledge. Ch. 3.
- Orenstein, A. (2002) *W. V. Quine* Chesham, Acumen. Ch. 4.
- Putnam, H. (1983) *Realism and Reason* Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. Ch. 5-6.
- (*) Quine, W. (1951) 'Two Dogmas of Empiricism', *The Philosophical Review* 60, 20-43.
- Russell, B. (2007) 'A Priori Justification and Knowledge', *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (available online).
- (*) Steup, M. and Sosa, E. (2005) *Contemporary Debates in Epistemology* Oxford, Blackwell. Ch. 4.

Scepticism

The following textbooks have chapters on scepticism:

- Armstrong, D. (1973) *Belief, Truth & Knowledge* London: Cambridge Press. Ch 11
- Audi, R. (1998) *Epistemology: A contemporary introduction to the theory of knowledge* London, Routledge. Ch. 10.
- Dancy, J. (1985) *Introduction to Contemporary Epistemology* Oxford, Blackwell. Ch. 1.
- Hookway, C. (1990) *Scepticism* London: Routledge.
- Kenny, A. (2005) *Medieval Philosophy* Oxford: OUP. Ch 4.
- Landesman, C. (1997) *An Introduction to Epistemology* Oxford: Blackwell. Ch. 3.
- Lehrer, K. (2000) *Theory of Knowledge* Boulder, Westview Press. Ch. 9.
- O'Brien, D. (2006) *The Theory of Knowledge* Cambridge, Polity Press. Ch. 9.
- Pritchard, D. (2006) *What is this thing called knowledge?* London: Routledge. Ch 12.
- Putnam, H. (1981) *Reason, Truth and History* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Ch 1.
- Russell, B. (1912) *The Problems of Philosophy* London: OUP. Ch 1-2.
- Stroud, B. (1984) *The Significance of Philosophical Scepticism* Oxford: Clarendon. Ch 2
- Williams, M. (2001) *Problem of Knowledge* Oxford, OUP. Ch. 16.

The following papers/collections may be of help:

- Alcoff, L. (ed.) (1998) *Epistemology: The Big Questions* Oxford: Blackwell. Part VI.

- Bailey, A. (1990) 'Pyrrhonian Scepticism and the Self-Refutation Argument', *The Philosophical Quarterly* 40, 27-44.
- Bernecker, S. (ed.) (2006) *Reading Epistemology* Oxford: Blackwell. Ch 6.
- Bosley, R. and Tweedale, M. (1997) *Basic Issues in Medieval Philosophy* Hadleigh: Broadview Press. Topic Seven.
- (*) Gallois, A. (1993) 'Is Global Scepticism Self-Refuting?', *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 71, 36-46.
- Greco, J. and Sosa, E. (eds.) (1999) *The Blackwell Guide to Epistemology* Oxford: Blackwell. Ch. 1, 2, 5 and 8.
- Huemer, M. (2002) *Epistemology: Contemporary Readings* London, Routledge. Part 9.
- (*) Moser, P. (2002) *The Oxford Handbook of Epistemology* Oxford: OUP. Ch 11.
- Sosa, E. *et al* (eds.) (2008) *Epistemology: An Anthology 2nd edition* Blackwell, Oxford. Part I
- (*) Steup, M. and Sosa, E. (2005) *Contemporary Debates in Epistemology* Oxford, Blackwell, Part I.

7. SEMINAR QUESTIONS

Here are all the questions for the seminars this semester. Note that *all* students must have prepared adequately for seminars. **Students who do not turn up with written answers to the seminar questions will be asked to leave the seminar.** If you cannot answer a question, note down *why*. In some cases the questions can be quite testing – so don't feel defeated if you cannot fully answer them. **However** I do expect you to be able to either answer enough questions, or clearly lay out your problems in answering them, such that you provide the one side of typed A4 (or equivalent) that you must then bring to the seminar.

Seminar One: Gettier Problems

- (1) Briefly define the following: conceptual analysis; iff; necessary; sufficient; tripartite theory of knowledge; counterexample.
- (2) Give your own *original* example of a Gettier counterexample to the tripartite theory of knowledge.
- (3) What does fully grounded mean? How is this meant to avoid the Gettier examples?
- (4) Does it avoid the Gettier example? Can you think of any way that the revised principle is too strong or too weak?

Having prepared answers to those questions, be ready to have a general discussion about the Gettier problems. Feel free to note down issues, points or arguments you want to make, and would like your colleagues to examine during the seminar. These may, or may not, be drawn from your answers to the above questions – you should feel free to explore other avenues if you so wish.

Seminar Two: Justification

- (1) Briefly define the following: Basic belief; Properly Basic Belief; regress; foundationalism, *a priori* belief; empirical belief; Coherentism; Reliabilism; Externalism; Internalism.
- (2) What is Agrippa's Trilemma? What options are there to avoid it?
- (3) When you see a bus coming, do you dive out of the way because you believe you have a bus shaped experience and then infer from that belief that there's a bus coming? How does this bear on foundationalism?
- (4) How serious a difficulty is the problem of hallucinations to the foundationalist enterprise?

- (5) Does foundationalism allow us to have knowledge?
- (6) Is it possible for someone to have a coherent set of beliefs that are radically different from yours? What problem does this pose for Coherentism?
- (7) Do you have a coherent belief structure? If not, what incoherent beliefs do you have? If you do have a coherent set of beliefs, how do you *know* that you have a coherent set of beliefs?
- (8) Compared to Foundationalism, what do you think of Coherentism?

Having prepared answers to those questions, be ready to have a general discussion about justification. Feel free to note down issues, points or arguments you want to make, and would like your colleagues to examine during the seminar. These may, or may not, be drawn from your answers to the above questions – you should feel free to explore other avenues if you so wish.

Seminar Three: Skills Seminar

There is no set reading for this seminar. Instead, you are required to (i) download the Mock Essay from WebCT, redraft that essay as if it were your own, print it out and take it to the seminar to discuss with your group and (ii) take your prepared essay plan to discuss with the group.

When redrafting the essay, do remember you are *redrafting* it, not proof reading it for grammatical errors. The mock essay needs some serious changes to it, so don't hold back from some hefty rewriting.

With the essay plan, you have to aim for the best balance of detail and brevity. No-one will want to sit there and listen to you read out 1000 words. Similarly, if you make it too lacking in detail no-one will be able to say anything helpful.

Seminar Four: Paradoxes

- (1) Briefly define: MEU; DP.
- (2) What is the argument for choosing one-box in Newcomb's paradox?
- (3) What is the argument for choosing both boxes in Newcomb's paradox?
- (4) Which principle, the MEU or the DP principle, plays a role in which argument?
- (5) How many boxes would you choose?
- (6) Why do you believe that the argument for the other choice unsound?
- (7) What is the Prisoner's Dilemma?
- (8) What would you do in the Prisoner's Dilemma? Defend your choice.
- (9) What is the Centipede Game? What does it aim to show? Is it rational, when playing the game, to stop at the first stage? If not, why not?

Having prepared answers to those questions, be ready to have a general discussion about these paradoxes. Feel free to note down issues, points or arguments you want to make, and would like your colleagues to examine during the seminar. These may, or may not, be drawn from your answers to the above questions – you should feel free to explore other avenues if you so wish.

Seminar Five: Induction/Other Minds

- (1) Briefly define: induction; Uniformity Principle.
- (2) Briefly give examples of three inductive arguments, ensuring that at least two are original examples of your own.

- (3) What is the Uniformity Principle? What is Hume's argument against induction?
- (4) Can you see any way out of Hume's problem of induction?
- (5) What is Mill's argument for the existence of other minds?
- (6) Why does Malcolm think it fails?
- (7) What is Price's argument for the existence of other minds? Why does Malcolm think it fails?
- (8) What is Malcolm's suggested way to account for other minds in section II of his paper?

Having prepared answers to those questions, be ready to have a general discussion about induction and other minds. Feel free to note down issues, points or arguments you want to make, and would like your colleagues to examine during the seminar. These may, or may not, be drawn from your answers to the above questions – you should feel free to explore other avenues if you so wish. You should also feel free to concentrate more on induction or other minds, although be aware that your colleagues might want to discuss the other – so you should be prepared to have a debate on those issues as well.